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I. SHOULD SOCIAL POLICY CONCERN 
ITSELF WITH DRUG "ABUSE"? 
A. J. CULYER 
University of York (England) 
There is a charming passage in Arthur Helps' Friends in Council where 
Milverton is as usual edifying his friends, this time with a fable. I cannot 
give the whole story here, but it concludes with an assembly of all things 
harmful to man electing the Mist as their King. They "set it on the brow of 
many a mountain where, when it is not doing evil, it may often be seen to 
this day" (Helps, 1951: 105). 
The most cursory examination of policy-orientated literature on drug 
"abuse" shows a veritable fog of confusion, of much potential mischief. I 
am not competent to disperse much of it. For example, we seem very 
ignorant about many pharmacological and physiological aspects of the 
problem. Such a pharmacological problem concerns the development of 
cheap, nondangerous ("nonnarcotic" in U.S. parlance) analgesics anal- 
ogous to morphine (derived from opium exudate) or pethidine (a synthetic 
narcotic) (Culver and Maynard, 1970). A physiological problem—or set of 
problems—concerns the long-term natural history of persons using drugs 
acting on the central nervous system (whether for therapeutic purposes or 
not), including the extent to which use of so-called "soft" drugs can lead 
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to "hard" drug dependence or use, as well as obtaining more reliable 
information about the general organic and psychological effects of 
prolonged drug use. 
The political economy of drug "abuse" is, however, something about 
which we should be able to say something. Indeed, Simon Rottenberg has 
given us an excellent start in what we may term the "positive" economics 
of controlling drug consumption (Rottenberg, 1968). I do not propose to 
add anything new to that, but rather to tackle the prior question—whether 
control is desirable, rather than whether it is feasible. In the space 
available, we can be no more than suggestive. Moreover, since the question 
of the relative desirability of various types of control is dependent upon 
their feasibility—and, thence, their cost-effectiveness—we must restrict 
discussion to the general level, which means delving into the "legislation of 
morals" or, in modern jargon, into "externalities" and "merit wants." 
What, I ask, are the externalities imposed on some members of society by 
drug "abuse"? 
Most of my assertions depend upon the negative slope of compensated 
demand curves. Is this realistic in the case of drugs? Many textbooks assert 
that drug addiction is the classic case where this proposition, inference, or, 
if you like, "law," does not hold. The assertion they make is that the 
addict, craving for more the more he consumes, has a rising marginal 
evaluation for the object of his habit. This is, I believe, erroneous and arises 
from a muddled view of the time dimension in demand theory. Our notion 
of demand is not one of sequential purchases through time, which the 
assertion implies, but one about purchases during a period of time. The 
addiction phenomenon is a dependency relationship between consumption 
during different periods of time. Today's injection of "H and C"' may 
imply that tomorrow's shot has a higher marginal evaluation, but it does 
not imply that two shots today do not have a lower marginal evaluation 
than one shot today. A second view of the compensated demand curve as 
showing the marginal evaluation of alternatives at a given moment of time 
carries a like implication by virtue of the convention that "a given moment 
of time" is a synonym for "under specified conditions." It must be clear 
that the most dependency-prone person cannot acquire any degree of 
dependency at "a given moment of time." A snapshot is a snapshot, but 
addiction or habituation are dynamic processes. 
That red herring behind us, it seems that there are six principal 
propositions upon which the case rests for prohibiting the nontherapeutic 
use of drugs or for providing or subsidizing rehabilitation services through 
the public purse (their significance varies according to the type of drug and 
the manner of its consumption): 
(1) that an individual drug user's behavior physically harms other members of 
society, for example, because users exhibit antisocial behavior of one kind or 
another, perhaps becoming violent, perhaps committing crimes in pursuit of 
finance; 
(2) that, sooner or later, the drug user may fall ill and require medical care and 
treatment which may be provided—indeed probably will be—out of the public 
purse; 
(3) that other persons simply find such behavior distasteful (disgusting, weak-
charactered, shiftless, irresponsible, and so on) even though they may have no 
direct contact with drug users; 
(4) that the drug user should be saved from his own folly; 
(5) that an individual's behavior may lead to a spreading through society of an 
undesired activity; 
(6) that the drug user is a less productive member of society and reduces gross 
domestic product. 
PHYSICAL HARM TO OTHERS 
Crime and nontherapeutic drug taking are closely linked in the public 
mind. This is partly because to take narcotics may itself be illegal and also 
because addicts sometimes commit petty crimes to enable themselves to 
continue taking drugs. An association between illegal actions (other than 
drug-taking) and drug dependence is not firmly established causally so far 
in Britain save occasionally in cases of LSD (a nonaddictive hallucinogen), 
with heavy doses of amphetamines which can induce aggression and, more 
frequently, with alcohol.' In New York, however, from 55 to 60% of the 
income addicts require to support their habits is derived from burglary, 
robbery, and larceny—a cumulative total "cost" of about $1.3 billion 
annually. There is no known relationship between drug use and violent 
crime, though about one-half of New York murders involved a drug user as 
either the perpetrator or the victim. But even if it could be firmly 
established that particular types (or all types) of nontherapeutic use of the 
drugs had harmful external effects, action could only be warranted on this 
ground if it could also be shown that the externality were Pareto-relevant 
at the margin or inframarginally. In short, society would have to decide 
not whether to cause the activity to cease altogether but whether, at 
current activity rates, the social benefit of a small or large reduction in the 
activity exceeded the social costs of implementing the reduction. Merely 
to establish the existence of a harmful external effect is not enough. One 
needs also to have information or guesses about: 
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(a) the technology of harmful effects—how bad and for which drugs; 
(b) the technology of control—quantitative examination of, for example, the 
relationships discussed by Rottenberg (1968); 
(c) the costs of the nuisance and of the resources needed to reduce it. 
One immediate possibility that may well be less costly than any other 
method in reducing the crime associated with drug abuse would be to 
legalize drug trafficking! A legal and more competitive—or even subsi- 
dized—industry could reduce the financing problem for addicts to trivial 
proportions. If this proposal is not acceptable, the explanation must lie in 
one of the other reasons why drug-taking is generally associated with social 
disapprobation. 
SUBSIDIZED TREATMENT 
If society has taken a collective decision to provide care, as it has in the 
United Kingdom, at (almost) zero money cost to the patient, it clearly has 
an interest in the state of every individual's health since the rest of society 
has an incentive to minimize the cost of care by taking preventive 
measures—of which the legal prohibition of drug-taking for kicks may be 
one. The trouble with this argument is that, since pretty well everything 
affects a person's health, it can provide a general warrant for almost any 
kind of interference with the individual. For example, smoking harms 
smokers' health, and the subsidized treatment argument could be—and has 
been—used to justify proposed restraints on smokers. Likewise, the logic 
suggests restraints on mountaineers, drivers, shoppers, and so on, as well as 
on drug users whose health may suffer in particular through lack of proper 
hygiene in administering drugs and through indifference to general 
healthiness. Hard-drug addicts are the severest problem. The heroin addict 
is a lonely, alienated, and disturbed individual with an almost irrestible 
urge toward self-destruction. In addition to the physical and psychological 
problems induced by the drug itself, there are also the personality 
problems that underlay his original decision to take up the drug and the 
tremendous incidental health hazards that accompany the life style of the 
hard addict and the administration of the drug. The popular method of 
"mainlining," for example (an intravenous injection), has appalling risks. 
One documented incident occurred when an addict inserted the hollow 
end of a sewing machine needle into the vein and slid a medicine dropper 
containing the solution over it, pressing against the skin. When the dropper 
was removed, the needle had vanished into the vein. 
At best, this argument implies either some degree of discouragement 
rather than making the activity in question illegal, or else a policy to 
ensure more suitable facilities for administering drugs, just as it may imply, 
in a less controversial area, encouragement for people to keep fit rather 
than compulsory keep-fit classes! 
INFORMATIONAL EXTERNALITIES 
The importance of the "informational" externality argument—that 
merely the knowledge that some person or persons behave in a particular 
way imposes an external harm (or benefit)—depends again upon the extent 
to which, for normative purposes, one wishes to use the Pareto criterion. 
If, somehow, you get to know about an activity by someone else that you 
either approve or disapprove of, then an informational externality exists. 
If the activity remained a secret from you, no externality would exist. If 
you dislike the color of my bedroom walls (so long as you are not my 
wife), or the fact that I am black, Jewish, or privately homosexual, there is 
a powerful argument for postulating that such external harms I impose on 
you should be regarded as irrelevant—as not detracting from social welfare. 
We simply disregard them. There may exist argument about whether to 
exclude some types of informational externality (e.g., your knowledge 
that I am poor, ill, ignorant) and which ones to exclude cannot be decided 
by any Paretian arguments. Essentially, one is making a high-level 
"constitutional" or political decision about whose welfare and which 
entities are to be counted in the social welfare function. The liberal 
approach would tend to exclude one set of effects, and others would 
exclude others. Only the most ultimate kind of Paretian approach would 
require all such externalities to be efficiently internalized—and it would 
also include, for example, the welfare of children as perceived by them 
rather than by parents, teachers, and the like. It is hard to imagine anyone 
(except children) in favor of so radical a position. 
In any case, as we have already observed above, even so radical an 
approach could not sanction prohibition, only compensated adjustment by 
one or another of the affected parties. The same is still true for drug users. 
MERIT WANTS 
The merit want argument, that drug users should be discouraged from 
the habit "in their own interest," is usually regarded as the type of 
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statement that cannot be evaluated by the Paretian approach, which 
assumes that only each individual regarded as being a member of "society" 
can know his own interest—and, if imperfectly, then more perfectly than 
anyone else. More strictly, the approach implies that we have no means of 
telling whether one person's assessment of another's interest is better than 
his own, but presumes that it is not. If someone seeks to argue that he 
knows someone else's interest better than that person himself, one has 
only to ask him to prove it. Unfortunately, the nature of a person's own 
"interest" is so thoroughly subjective that such an objective proof cannot 
be discovered (see, e.g., Culyer, 1971). In practice, merit wants are just a 
fancy name for saying that you want to arrange someone else's life for him 
even though the behavior in question affects neither your physical person 
nor your wealth. No consistent practical policy attitude can be based on 
both the Paretian system and the merit want argument, so long as the 
person whose behavior is lacking in "merit" counts as a member of 
"society" (i.e., his welfare, as he sees it, counts in social welfare). Thus, if 
drug users are to be counted as members of society and the Paretian 
apparatus used, the merit want argument for acting to protect their 
interest cannot be sustained. Even though one may be utterly appalled by 
the condition of drug users and addicts, one is giving qualitative expression 
to one's own valuation of their condition, health, way of life, and so on, 
which is not the same thing as their valuation. Even if—and this may be 
hard to swallow—the drug addicts themselves later regret having become 
addicts, this does not justify any current preventive action against 
potential future addicts on the grounds that it is in their interest. The 
choice is simple and unambiguous: either their welfare counts in the same 
way as everyone else's or it does not. In the latter case, it must be one's 
own interpretation of their welfare that counts—an externality. The Pareto 
system does not help us decide who shall have the "franchise"—though 
there is usually a presumption that exclusions need a strong foundation. 
The real question, then, is whether the foundation is strong enough in this 
case. Economics cannot answer this, but the reader will have his own 
ethical views. Once this "constitutional" choice is made, however, the 
Paretian apparatus can once more be brought into play, with the welfare 
of drug users as they see it either included or excluded from social welfare. 
TRANSMISSION OF THE DRUG HABIT 
The methods by which the habit is spread among the drug-using 
subculture and by which the subculture itself is widened are partially  
known (Rottenberg, 1968). Insofar as this is only a "scale" effect, it is not 
of substantive importance in the normative policy question with which we 
are concerned, though it affects the social significance of any genuine 
social harm done and is, of course, of great importance in the positive 
approach to policy-implementing effective anti-drug policies. 
The transmission effect is, however, of importance—of critical impor-
tance—in one respect, which is that it is the mechanism by which minors 
are exposed to the habit. Since the welfare of children is their welfare as 
perceived by adults, their protection is one of the most important aspects 
of any social policy toward drug use, and the effect on children is certainly 
an externality that should be taken into account in any reasonable 
interpretation of Pareto optimality. To physical harm imposed upon 
others, we may thus add a second harmful factor in the Paretian approach 
to drug-use control. 
THE OUTPUT ARGUMENT 
The final set of arguments for legal intervention is based upon the 
effects that drug-taking may have on the efficiency of the individual as a 
worker or on the length of his working life. These, however, are arguments 
that are related to output-maximization, not welfare-maximization. They 
would be characteristic of someone with entirely materialistic values, who, 
in a social sense, might be exceedingly concerned over the rate of growth 
of GDP, but they are not characteristic of Paretian economics. 
Insofar as individuals can affect their life-expectation, they do so in a 
presumptively optimal fashion (from their own point of view); likewise, 
the time allocated to work and nonwork is also presumptively optimal. As 
far as the loss of GDP is concerned, this should concern us, for marginal 
withdrawls from the labor force, only insofar as wages do not reflect the 
social value of an individual's product. If wages are higher than this level, 
the rest of society gains, in one sense, from the person's withdrawal. If 
they are less, then there is an inefficiency, the removal of which the 
Paretian apparatus sanctions without additional arguments, and which 
should be done. Policies to prohibit drug-taking can, however, be justified 
on the output argument where there are economic shortages of labor 
which for some reason are permitted to persist. The empirical significance 
of such cases is not, however, very great. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our conclusion as a result of these considerations is that the only 
arguments with genuine Paretian significance so long as drug users' welfare 
is a part of social welfare are related to physical harm to others and to the 
"corruption" of minors. Any policy prescription based upon this analysis 
should strictly be based upon a careful cost-effectiveness analysis of the 
alternatives. Here, however, it is worth mentioning one policy which 
appears likely a priori to be very cost-effective. We have already indicated 
that legalization of trafficking and more competitive production and 
distribution could in principle reduce the first problem substantially. No 
argument suggests that consumption per se ought to be illegal in a Pareto 
efficient social policy. Consequently, full legalization for adults, together 
with "zoning" regulations to protect minors from contact with adult users, 
appears to be a probably efficient policy. Existing legislation concerning 
public consumption of alcohol provides a basic model for the kind of 
institutional framework appropriate. If you find this possibility unappe- 
tizing, you are probably disagreeing either with the Paretian framework or 
with the implied "constitutional" definition of society and those entities 
to be included as relevant to social welfare. 
NOTES 
1. Heroin and cocaine. Cocaine is believed not to produce physical dependence. 
It is rarely taken alone, but usually with heroin, which is addictive. 
2. The unfortunate connection between hashish (cannabis) and the Hashishins -
the assassins employed by the Saracens against the Crusaders—can mislead here. The 
Hashishins received their dope after the job was done, not in order to enable them to 
do it. It was a highly valued reward for an addict so long as its production and 
distribution could be monopolized by their employers. The Hashishins were cruelly 
exploited and were particularly vulnerable since hashish was easily available to their 
employers—an alternative reward of equal effectiveness would have cost the 
employers a great deal more. 
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